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Introduction
There exists a common anxiety, among American scholars and politicians alike,
surrounding China’s rise to power. It is argued that an ascendant China, and the impact it will
have on the established world order, is the most pressing geostrategic challenge of this era.1
Never before has a nation risen so fast, to such an extent. Since China’s opening and their
free-market reforms in 1979, it has seen GDP growth averaging 9.5% through 2018, a pace
described by the World Bank as “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.”
2

Moreover, as China rises, so does its political influence and military capabilities. For nearly a

century, the U.S. has been the dominant military power in the Pacific. This balance of power is
being challenged as China has continued to grow its presence in the hemisphere. Xi Jinping
himself has said “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of
Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.”3 This perpetuates the perception that China could be a
revisionist state, with the objective of altering or undermining the U.S. world order. There is an
idea that China could become a security issue, that it will try to use its growing influence to
reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to serve its own interests4.
Contemporary China’s rise to power has been compared to Imperial Germany, Cold War Soviet
Union, and even an aggressive U.S. ploying for regional power. A growing China, therefore, is a

1
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growing threat to the U.S. and the world. This 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.3 billion people,
is not just going to disappear. It is a “chronic situation” that must be dealt with.5
The predominant approaches to the China problem are understood to be engagement or
containment. Engagement seeks to incorporate a rising power into the pre-established
international order, while avoiding and eliminating any revisionist tendencies. Engagement is
sought, through open channels of communication and material incentives, socializing a rising
power with the norms and values that define the existing international order.6 Many China and
foreign policy specialists hold that enmeshing China in as many international regimes and
binding commitments as possible so as to minimize its potential for disruptive behavior and
allow for its smooth integration into the international order.7
The groundwork for contemporary Sino-American engagement was laid with President
Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, after nearly a quarter century of non-communication.
The Nixon administration was the original architect of a U.S. foreign policy on China built
around engagement, seeing the opportunity to integrate the PRC peacefully into the international
order. This growth of U.S.-China relations was disrupted by the Tiananmen massacre of
pro-democracy demonstrators in June 1989. The Clinton Administration sought to stabilize the
relationship with China, through a policy of “comprehensive engagement.” Strides towards this
included China's accession to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. The last
two decades, with the rapid and undeniable rise of China, have seen especially interesting
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developments in efforts of engagement. In 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the U.S.-China
Relations Act of 2000, establishing normal trade relations between the two countries and paving
the way for China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001. In a speech five years later,
Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick urged China to fulfil its duty as a rising power by
serving as a “responsible stakeholder” in the world order.8 In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton first outlined the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” in an essay for Foreign Policy.
The underlying principles of this foreign policy strategy include re-engagement with regional
organizations, a continued effort to build a cooperative relationship with China, advancement in
free and fair trade, and economic partnerships, and support for “fundamental human rights.”
Later, in 2014 U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping issued a joint
statement on climate change, pledging to reduce carbon emissions.
On the other end of the spectrum is containment. Containment emerged as an official
U.S. strategic foregin policy, during the Cold War, in response to the threat of the Soviet Union
widening its sphere of influence. Containment is the aim to restrict the power and influence of a
rising power, by raising the price of realizing revisionist aims. This is pursued through means
such as, the threat of material punishment like economic sanctions or force, and measures to curb
influence by balancing a rising power's growing military capabilities. The goal is to thwart
further growth of a rising state’s power and to prevent significant challenges to the established
international order.
In practice, U.S. foreign policy on China has never been simply engagement or
containment, but rather an interesting hybrid between the two. In almost every example of a
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seemingly engagement driven China policy, efforts toward containment are looming not far
behind, or are the thinly veiled true goal. This is especially apparent in Obama’s “pivot” to Asia.
The main proponents of this policy involve the U.S. establishing military, economic, and
diplomatic ties with countries near and bordering China. The U.S. has ramped up its naval
presence in the South China Sea, overseen a transfer of some of the most advanced naval and air
force systems to the Pacific theater, and it has reaffirmed defense assurances to Japan covering
territory challenged by China.9 While the Trump administration’s Foreign Policy on China is
hard to pin down, it is clear, just through the so called trade war, that a classic engagement
strategy is not the goal. In July of 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even declared in a
speech that the era of engagement with the CCP is over, warning China to change its behavior
and respect the rules of the international order.
Engagement expects China to subserviently and harmoniously fold into the U.S. led
world order, and containment works to forcibly thwart the power and influence of China, in order
to maintain this established international order. U.S. foreign policy, then, functions on the basis
that China is subordinate to the U.S., and must always remain so. In other words, a world order
not led by the U.S. is completely unimaginable. Foreign policies do not recognize China as
China, but instead as a projection of U.S. expectations. China, thus, is not permitted to exist in
the international stage on its own terms. The goal of this paper is to confront the consistent
shortcomings of U.S. foreign policy on China. I propose that discourse dictates and limits the
way that the U.S. can perceive and, thus, approach China. Discourse on China is limited, thereby
limiting the possibilities of foreign policy
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In the first section of this paper I lay out a framework for analyzing U.S. discourse on
China. I make the argument that discourse on China is a particular kind of discourse influenced
by what Edward Said has defined as Orientalism. Orientalism can be broadly described as an
essentialist and reductionist discourse that ascribes indispensable characteristics to the non-West,
or Orient, situating it as the West’s ultimate other. For the purposes of this paper I follow Michel
Foucault’s definition of discourse as a historically contingent social system that produces
knowledge and meaning. With this in mind, I propose the limits of discourse lie in three of its
main functions, (1) the structuring of binary oppositions; (2) the construction of perceived
realities; and (3) the creation and reaffirmation of identities. I argue that the U.S. imagination on
China is informed by a vast array of contradictory images, that all exist as true within the
discursive framework. From here, I explore how discourse works to limit U.S. foreign policy
more specifically.
The second section of this paper traces and examines U.S. discourse on China and its
effects on foreign policy. This investigation begins with President Richard Nixon and National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s 1972 trip to the People’s Republic of China, which
commenced modern Sino-American diplomatic relations. I will use this as a framework to
navigate discourse and foreign policy on China during the Obama administration. My aim is to
illuminate the ways that discourse has limited foreign policy approaches to China. I do this by
discursively analyzing speeches, political rhetoric, policies, interviews, news media, and more. I
will further scrutinize the significance of discourse in delving into common U.S. anxieties about
China.

6

Finally, I will solidify the arguments by showing that U.S. imagination on China
remained the status quo, even under the controversial presidency of Donald Trump. Interestingly,
Trump is able to discern a failure of China policy, and seems to try to break with the norm.
However, the U.S. imagination is so dominant in American understanding of China, he is unable
to transcend the limits of discourse or limited foreign policy. I then briefly convey Joe Biden’s
perpetuation of this framework, before looking towards the future of Sino-American relations.
Through this paper it becomes abundantly clear that U.S. foreign policy approaches that do not
take China on its own terms, become increasingly more unacceptable as it continues to become a
more powerful figure.

7

Chapter 1
On Discourse
In the long history of our associations with China, these two sets of images [of a
wonderfully civilized and brutally barbaric place] rise and fall, move in and out of the
center of people’s minds over time, never wholly displacing each other, always coexisting,
each ready to emerge at the fresh call or circumstance, always new, yet instantly garbed
in all the words and pictures of a much written literature, made substantial and unique in
each historic instance by the reality of recurring experience… Our emotions about the
Chinese have ranged between sympathy and rejection, parental exasperation, affection
and hostility, love and fear close to hate.
–Harold Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds:
American Views of China and India
There are noticeable themes and common narratives in the way China is talked about in
the U.S.. It is commonplace and unsurprising to hear officials boast their “toughness” on China,
or criticize others lack-there-of, while employing rhetoric that characterizes China as both
drastically inferior to the U.S. and a great existential threat. China has, in recent years has been
an increasingly prevalent point of nationalist discussion, especially as it continues to rise on the
world stage. Secretary of State State Mike Pompeo has stated that it must be ensured that “China
retains only its proper place in the world” and Newt Gingrich has claimed China is “the greatest
threat to us since the British Empire in the seventeen-seventies, much greater than Nazi Germany
or the Soviet Union.”10 This rhetoric is not unique to republicans, it traverses the bounds of party
politics. In the final debate for the 2020 U.S. presidential election, Joe Biden pledged that, if
elected, he would force China to “play by the international rules.”11 This reflects more than
simply the desire of the U.S. to remain the world’s hegemonic superpower. There are actually
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discursive limits that define the way the U.S. can approach China. Discourse is extremely
influential in the production of social, cultural, and political practices. Michel Foucault defines
discourse as a historically contingent social system that produces knowledge and meaning. In
this line, discourse is a set of statements that creates a particular way of seeing and thinking
about a given topic. Discourses can be understood as systems of signification that construct
social realities. Therefore, it is not the material world that conveys meanings, but rather, people
construct meaning by modes of signification represented in discourse. Through shaping and
creating meaning systems, discourses gain the status and currency of “truth.” Stepping outside of
the structure of meaning and truths of a discourse, can be attributed only to deviance or
abnormality.
These limitations consequently influence the objectives, operation, and execution of
foreign policy. To approach foreign policy discursively, is to place emphasis on the linguistic
construction of reality. Actors are constructed and become articulated within particular
discourses. Agents of foreign policy, then, function within a discursive space that imposes
meanings on their world and constructs a reality. To be accepted, actors and policies themselves,
must fit into the reality that has been constructed and established in a society. Foreign policy
reflects discourse, constructing a particular kind of international order consisting of various kinds
of national identities. Barnett and Duval define power as the production, in and through social
relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate.
Productive power is the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through

9

systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope.12 The concept
of power in international relations points to the role of discourses in contingently producing a
defined global order and actors tied to their self-understandings and established reality. The
conundrum of the foreign policies towards China, then, are side effects of the limits of
established discourses. The strange duality in the U.S. discourse on China is a manifestation of
the immensely varied array of favorable and unfavorable images, notions, attitudes, impressions,
and experiences (real and exaggerated) that make up a particular U.S. imagination on China.
To recognize the full extent to which discourse affects U.S. approaches China, it is
important to understand what exactly discourse does. Discourses can be characterized by 3
central functions, (1) they are structured largely in terms of binary oppositions, by which objects
are distinguished from one another. Such oppositions can embody and reproduce certain patterns
of thinking; (2) they construct regimes of truth and epistemic realities, which define what can be
thought and said about a particular subject; and (3) they create and reaffirm identities.
Firstly, discourses construct binaries. Ferdinand de Saussure proposed that meaning in
language is obtained, through binary opposition. Each unit of language being defined in
reciprocal determination with another. All systems in Western thought have been founded upon
the logic of binary oppositions, such as man/woman, old/young, good/evil, sun/moon,
man/woman, birth/death, black/white. Commencing the post-structuralist movement, Jacques
Derrida claims that one side of the binary is always given a more privileged position than its
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Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics." International Organization 59, no. 1
(2005), 55.
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opposite, that one term is "marked" as positive and the other as negative. These contrasts are
inherently mutually exclusive, something cannot be both old and young at the same time. To give
anything an identity, to make claims about what it is, is necessarily also to say what it is not. In
this sense, presence contains absence. Therefore, the presence of any one quality is dependent on
the implication of the absence of its binary opposite.13 Derrida maintains, speech must
necessarily articulate the binary oppositions constructed in text if it is to make any sense
whatsoever.
In certain ways U.S. discourse is informed by a broader tradition of Western construction
of non-Western cultures, that Edward Said defines as Orientalism. This is an essentialist and
reductionist discourse that ascribes indispensable characteristics to the non-West, defining it as
the West’s ultimate other. This constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions––
East vs West, “Occident” vs “Orient”––that produce the East as the mirror image of the West:
where "we" are rational and civilized, "they" are impulsive and barbaric; where "we" are modern
and progressive, "they" are despotic and stagnant; where "we" are honest and compassionate,
"they" are backwards and uncultivated.14 Considering the dynamic of mutual exclusivity, because
the non-West, is impulsive and barbaric, it can never be rational and civilized; because it is
despotic and stagnant, it can never be modern and progressive, and so on. Thus, in the East vs.
West binary, the West is granted the privileged position, with the East being marked as negative.
These binaries, then, work to establish global and cultural hierarchies of power and dominance.

13

Vivien Burr, An Introduction to Social Constructionism. London: Routledge, 2003.
Hugh Gusterson, "Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination." Cultural Anthropology 14, no. 1
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Orientalism is certainly a stitch in the fabric that constructs the U.S. imagination on
China. However, the state of discourse on China cannot be explained solely by generic
Orientalism. In fact there are other, entirely contradictory, images that are simultaneously present
in the discursive construction of China. More than just the East vs. West binary, American
images of China largely exist as paradoxical binary pairs, simultaneously a superior civilization
and an inferior people. As Harold Isaacs writes, “our notions of Chinese traits have included sage
wisdom and superstitious ignorance, great strength and contemptible weakness, immovable
conservatism and unpredictable extremism, philosophical calm and explosive violence.”15 On the
one hand, centuries worth of powerful imagery of China’s ancient greatness widley attributes
qualities such as wisdom, honor, and stoicism to the Chinese people. On the other hand, there
exists quite another set of images of China’s inferiority, a China in need of the sympathetic
goodwill and high moral intent that makes up the American identity, along with a conception of
Chinese cruelty, barbarism, and inhumanity. All of these binaries and images of China exist
simultaneously in discourse. The collection of positives and negatives that construct the U.S.
imagination of China, fluctuate as the main concentration of discourse, but never disappear
completely, often existing simultaneously, always ready to be revived to meet the current
circumstances.
The second function of discourses is that they created regimes of truth and epistemic
realities. Discourse is a set of statements that creates a particular way of thinking about a given
topic. Foucault notes that discourse produces practices that systematically form the objects of
which they speak. It restricts the way of thinking because it forms knowledge, for there is no

15
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knowledge outside discourse. Discourse is productive and reproductive, of the knowledge it
defines. This knowledge is always produced by effects of power within a social order, and this
power prescribes particular rules and categories which designate preconditions for legitimating
what is and is not accepted within the discursive order. In order for any knowledge to be
accepted as legitimate, it must conform to the established truths within the discursive order,
discourses are not simply groupings of utterances, grouped around a theme or an issue,
nor are they simply sets of utterances which emanate from a particular institutional
setting, but discourses are regulated groupings of utterances or statements with internal
rules which are specific to discourse itself.16
By pre-determining the categories of reason by which statements are accepted as knowledge,
discourses create an epistemic reality.17 Discourse, then, determines the parameters of what can
be thought and understood. Foucault proposes that “we know perfectly well that we are not free
to just say anything, when we like or where we like,” for we are conditioned to conform to
dominant discourses.18 Foucault uses the ideas of “power” and “knowledge” to signify that
power is established through accepted forms of knowledge and “truth.” Each society has its
regime of truth, the discourse which it accepts and establishes as true, the means by which
statements are distinguished as true or false, and the status of those tasked with maintaining what
counts as true.19
Images of China as inferior have been at the forefront of general Western conceptions of
China, since the 19th century. Following the first Opium War of 1839, China came to be viewed
as “a victim and subject, source of profit, object of scorn, and ultimately, by Americans, as a
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ward.”20 Up until 1949, U.S. contact with China was most heavily characterized by the impact of
American missionaries in China. Along with all of the essentializing truths that make up the U.S.
imagination, most Americans, importantly, regarded the Chinese to be receivers of American
missionary saviorism. The American missionary enterprise in China lasted over a century and
came to involve thousands of missionaries, the investment of millions of dollars, and a highly
emotional parental attachment to China. It was through missionaries that the U.S. became
economically and politically involved in China, all three having complementary and intertwined
goals. After all, if China had the largest population of souls to enlighten, it could also become the
largest population of U.S. customers, and a land of endless opportunities for American trade and
investments. Moreover, the notion of saving China through the influence of Christianity is not a
far jump to saving China through the influence of American liberal democratic ideals and values.
This has established an “elaborate structure of guardianship, benevolent purpose, sympathetic
goodwill, and high moral intent that still surrounds the American self picture in relation to China
and the Chinese.”21
At the same time, while the specific American discourse on China has been to a great
extent rooted in missionary associations, this does not upend the entrenched images of China that
arouse both admiration and fear in Americans. The impression of China as one of the world’s
oldest and most cultured civilizations is crucial to its construction in the U.S. imagination. China
had invented things like “paper, movable type, the compass, porcelain, gunpowder, and had great
sages, poets, and artists long before the Western man himself was civilized.”22 While the respect
and admiration for China are grounded in the imagery of its great past, these feelings are
20
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maintained in discourse without any definite placement in its impressively long enduring history.
Contradictory to the notions of both China’s peaceful weakness, is the representation of China as
cruel or dangerous––very much related to the general Orientalist trope of “Oriental barbarism”
and the widespread “Yellow Peril.” Discourse on China can instantly recall images of female
infantacide; foot binding; the distressing violence of the anti-Christian, anti-imperialist Boxer
Rebellion; Communist terror; and arguably the most productive of these images is that of the
terror induced Mongol ruler and conqueror Genghis Khan and the “hordes'' of Mongol warriors.
Thus, imagination on China is further rooted in the Orientalist and racist concept of “Yellow
Peril”: the existential fear that the danger the “faceless, nameless hordes of people '' in the
Asia-Pacific pose to the Western world. Thus, even when these images are not at the forefront of
discourse, there is the understanding of China as some sort of “sleeping dragon”––which could
someday reawaken to embody its full formidable form.
Despite the contradictions and inconsistencies, all of these representations exist as
simultaneously true in the discursive framework that defines China. This discourse does not
engage with the China that exists in reality, it engages with a construction and understanding of
China that exists only in the U.S. imagination. This imaginary China is simultaneously a great
and long enduring nation, an inferior and weak country in need of U.S. guidance, and a cruel and
violent land with an endless supply of warriors. U.S. discourse, therefore, is not truth but
(mis)representation, and all representations are created and shaped by discourse and power
structures.23 In Said’s words, “knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge,
and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control.”24 Therefore by
23
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24
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“knowing” China, the U.S. perpetually concludes both its distinctive role as China’s benevolent
keeper; and also China’s position as an experienced and treacherous threat.
Lastly, discourses work to establish identities. Discourse is productive, and what is being
produced are ideas and statements that constitute the whole of the object being defined.
Discursive representation is done from a position of exteriority, where the object is defined and
discussed by an external narrative. The producer of a particular discourse is excluded from being
the potential object of essentialist representation. More than this, the producer’s identity is
constructed through the construction of the object it works to define. Those represented are
rendered mute while the producer of such ideas gains strength and identity.25 To reintroduce the
theory of Orientalism––Said argues that "the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as
its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience."26 The existence of the Western identity is
dependent on the implication of the absence of its binary opposite, so––“we” are rational and
civilized because “they'' are impulsive and barbaric; “we” are modern and progressive because
“they'' are despotic and stagnant; “we” are honest and compassionate because “they ”are
backwards and uncultivated; and so on. By producing and reproducing its imagination of China,
the U.S. is simultaneously constructing and guaranteeing its own identity. That which falls
outside the bounds of dominant discourse, is not only marked as deligitimate, it actually
threatens the national identity that the U.S. has created.

25
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There is the theory that states do not merely seek physical security but also ontological
security, or the security of self-identity. States are thus not only interested in survival but also in
the continuation of the self in the international order––the self being the subjective sense of who
one is, which enables and motivates action and choice.27 States become attached to established
roles and routines because they sustain self-identity, providing ontological security. Jennifer
Mitzen argues that routines (cognitive and behavioral) are followed even when they are
destructive and endanger the actor. Self identity is sustained through narratives, that link
behavior to self understanding.28 Profound challenges to state identity, or disruptions to routine,
upset established beliefs and generate anxiety. These anxieties are quelled by the return to the
entrenched routines and narratives. The identity of the U.S. is created and maintained, in part,
through the discursive construction of China. Thus, foreign policy, which functions within this
discursive framework, is a routine by which the U.S. protects this identity. Of course, foreign
policy then is not informed by the physical reality of China, but an imaginary construction of
China. The contradictory truths attributed to China requires a foreign policy that maintains a
superior-subordinate relationship with China, but also properly recognizes the potential power
and danger of the so-called “sleeping dragon.” Thus, is the basis of the confused and limited
containment and engagement approaches to China. The established truths and epistemic realities
of China created by discourse are being simultaneously exasperated and challenged by the very
real China, especially as it continues its spectacular rise on the world stage. However, forgoing
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this discourse, and recognizing the true China that actually exists in reality, would mean
threatening U.S. identity. The friction between the actual nation of China, and the China that
exists only in U.S. discourse, shakes the claims to global dominance the U.S. imagines for itself.
The fixed nature of discourse and modern U.S. foreign policy, while extremely limited and
limiting, works to quell the anxiety that China induces, affirming the exclusive right to global
authority the U.S. imagines for itself.
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Chapter 2
Imagining China
Part 1: Richard Nixon
we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations.
–Richard M. Nixon Asia after Viet Nam29
The year 1949 proved to have momentous effects on the formulation of the post-World
War II international order. In October of 1949, following the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)
triumph in the Civil War and the Nationalist Party’s retreat to Taiwan, Mao Zedong declared the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC.) The defeat of the Nationalist Party came
as an unwelcome shock to Americans, who envisioned China, under the leadership of Chang Kai
Shek (a practicing Christian,) as an idealized “free” and “democratic” ally and subservient pupil,
that would learn how to be a good liberal state in the new U.S. led world order. As the most
populous state in the world, China would benefit the U.S. economically, through its potential
production capabilities, and strategically, in the Cold War competition between the U.S. and
Soviet Union. Instead, the U.S. gained a new rival and the Cold War extended into East Asia.
This commenced a period of estrangement in Sino-American diplomatic relations, and a U.S.
foreign policy focused solely on containment, which lasted over twenty years.
After two decades dedicated to containing the threat of China, in July of 1971, the world
was stunned by the announcement that U.S. President Richard Nixon would be travelling to the
PRC, to pursue the normalization of relations between the two countries. And on February 21st,
1972 President Nixon, accompanied by his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, made
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history as the first U.S. president to step foot in the PRC and the only one to meet Chairman Mao
Zedong. This seven day trip, culminating in the jointly issued Shanghai Communique, set in
motion a new era of Sino-American relations, and publicly presented the U.S. 's intention of
rapprochement with China. Nixon, however, first introduced the notion of rapprochement years
prior, in a 1967 Foreign Affairs article, before he was even president. He again referred to it
indirectly, in his 1969 inaugural address, where he says, “Let all nations know that during this
administration our lines of communication will be open. We seek an open world–open to ideas,
open to the exchange of goods and people–a world in which no people, great or small, will live
in angry isolation.”30 In a climate where no American leader had even publicly referred to the
PRC by its proper name, (opting instead for Communist or Red China) these indirect allusions to
a Sino-American relationship were the first steps in a long process of complex and subtle
diplomacy that eventually brought about a reconciliation between the two nations. These remarks
further represent the shift to a political discourse on China that is still dominant to this day.
While Nixon newly introduced engagement as a foreign policy strategy, in respect to the PRC,
ideas of containment lay not far below the surface. In fact there exists a confused duality
between the two approaches, which have contradictory but intertwined goals.
It would seem astounding that an American president who built a career on hostility to
Communism and a Chinese leader who had raised a whole generation on anti-American
imperialism, came to shake hands in front of the world, after twenty years of silence. However,
from the very beginning of his presidency, Nixon apparently recognized the importance of
reestablishing communication with China. Up until 1949, U.S. contact with China was most
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heavily characterized by the impact of American missionaries. As such, Americans, the same
Americans who chose most of the countries leaders, “had to a remarkable extent come to see
Chinese as objects of benevolence, as wards under kindly American guardians who knew better
than the Chinese did what was good for them on earth and in heaven.”31 It was this line of
thinking that brought about powerful emotions related to the “loss” of China, which generated
“deep parental sorrow and aroused righteous anger and meriting just punishment of isolation,”
feeling the Chinese had “bitten the hands that fed them.”32 These years of a nearly total
severance in communication between the two nations, left room for U.S. imagination to fill in the
gaps left by the lapse in interaction with China. One of the images that was produced in this
process was China as a figure to be feared. Bearing in mind the geopolitical context of the Cold
War, this was certainly related to China’s communist association to the Soviet power system.
However, from the fall of the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1949, the PRC was deemed as more
radical than the Soviet Union and the more antagonistic of the two Communist states.
The identification of China as a threat first came especially to the forefront of discourse,
upon its entrance into the Korean War, where it proved to be an unexpected military match to the
United States. In an interview for Harold Isaac’s book, a former high official of the Eisenhower
administration remarked “I was brought up to think that the Chinese couldn’t handle a machine.
Now, suddenly, they are flying jets!”33 China was almost instantly transformed from a scorned
and passive weakling into an aggressive and formidable potential foe. This allowed for the
images of the “untrustworthy Orient” to flourish in a new and seemingly tangible context,
breathing new life into the extremely antiquated notion of the Chinese warrior. Suddenly, the
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“hordes'' of barbaric Mongol warriors, violently expanding their empire, reemerged centuries
later as the People’s Liberation Army, imagined to be superior only in their seemingly limitless
supply of expendable human lives. By the time Nixon entered office in 1969, with the Korean
War long over, the U.S. was facing international humiliation over its role in the unwinnable
Vietnam War––which it entered largely in an attempt to restrain the spread of China’s influence.
At the same time, friendly relations between the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China
broke down in the early sixties and in the first year of Nixon’s presidency the two countries
engaged in a seven month hostile border conflict that threatened the possibility of war. Thus, the
Soviet Union came to embody the most pressing threat to China. The trauma over the “loss” of
China, had been surpassed by more contemporary traumas, while it was also becoming
increasingly evident that efforts towards complete physical containment were less than effective.
Pursuing a renewal in relations with China was, to a great extent, an effort to confront and quell
the threat the U.S. perceived China to be. This in turn reintroduced emotional attachments to
images of the “good Chinese people,” who deserved, and needed, America’s paternal leadership.
On the other hand, rapprochement was assuredly motivated by a legitimate desire to
enjoy a relationship with China. The so-called loss of China did not merely devastate Americans
emotionally, it physically cut off over 800 million potential customers to American industry.
Thus, leading up to rapprochement, the U.S. imagination was simultaneously creating
nightmares about China’s danger, and fantasies about the millions of frustratingly unmaterialized
Chinese consumers. A Sino-American relationship further offered the U.S strategic benefits. For
one, in the context of the Cold War, bringing China to American’s side of the struggle could give
the U.S. more leverage with Moscow; and additionally China’s cooperation was crucial to
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bringing the war in Vietnam to a close. It moreover would serve the U.S. interest, and support its
imagined claim to global hegemony, to have influence over the largest population in the world.
With the newly emerging political discourse surrounding rapprochement, came the notion
that the PRC and U.S. represented the world’s most “consequential bilateral relationship.”34 This
certainly was particularly informed by the perception that China could possibly present an
exceptional threat to the peace and safety of the world. It was up to the U.S., as the most
powerful nation in the world––who has historically imagined its unique role as China’s
keeper––to confront and stifle this threat. In the same Foreign Affairs article that Nixon first
raised the idea of engagement, he also states that China is “the world’s most populous nation and
Asia’s most immediate threat.”35 Thus, the successful 1972 presidential trip to China is
notoriously referred to as “the week that changed the world.” In preliminary discussions with
Chou En-lai, Kissinger asserted that the President was personally committed to improving
Sino-American relations “for the sake of our two peoples and for the sake of the world.”36 Later,
in one of his multiple toasts throughout his time in China, Nixon remarked that if the American
and Chinese people are enemies, “the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if
we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably
increased.”37 After his initial secret trip to China, Kissinger reported to Nixon that the
groundwork had been laid for them to “turn a page in history,” but the PRC would turn out to be
an “implacable foe” if the rapprochement were to go wrong.38 Discourse represented China to
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inherently possess the capacity to be incredibly dangerous, and foreign policy consequently had
to realize and address this danger. Nixon’s foreign policy goals were genuinely optimistic about a
relationship with China, but indeed reflected the conception that China is dangerous.
Engagement was looked upon as something that could diminish the threat of China, as it would
give the U.S. the access necessary to condition and guide China to be a well behaved state. In a
confused way, engagement was sought as an alternative method to achieve similar goals to
containment.
The prospect of rapprochement went hand in hand with a vision of incorporating China
into the liberal world order. Following the end of the Second World War, the U.S. was left in a
unique place of power to take the lead in constructing a new world order that reflected its own
interests. It was through this process that the U.S. established its identity as the most powerful
nation in the world––with an exclusive claim to global hegemony and authority. This post WWII
world order was developed, throughout the second half of the 20th century, around norms and
institutions that both demonstrated and reinforced the international dominance of the United
States. Throughout the years of Sino-American severance, it became increasingly unacceptable
for China to function outside of the liberal global order. In Nixon’s statements of support for a
Sino-American relationship, direct and indirect, there is a recurring emphasis on China’s position
vis-a-vis the international community. In his Foreign Affairs piece, Nixon argues “we simply
cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations...There is no place on this
small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.”39 In
Nixon’s first Foreign Policy Report to Congress (1970,) the first significant public step towards
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rapprochement, the section on China begins, “the Chinese are a great and vital people who
should not remain isolated from the international community.”40 These moments epitomize the
U.S. motives for rapprochement. Opening China up to the international community, meant
socializing it to be a well behaved and valuable member of the U.S. led world order, which
called for subservience to U.S. authority and influence. This would not only neutralize the threat
of a free-willed China, but also rehabilitate the “proper” relationship between the U.S. and
China. With the previously established image of China as the United States’ ward, it was only
natural that this superior-subordinate relationship be fully realized through China’s participation
in the U.S. dominated world order. In fact, in the discursive construction, it is necessary that
China and the U.S. fulfill their respective roles.
By the Nixon administration, the U.S. identity was inextricably tied to its place in the
global order. The subordination of China had historic roots in the U.S. imagination, but was
further grounded in a new discourse that accounted for American global hegemony. In his book,
On China, Henry Kissinger offers some reflections on U.S. strategy towards China during the
Nixon administration. On Nixon’s new approach to foreign policy, he writes “Nixon was
committed...to giving America a dynamic role in reshaping the international order just emerging
piece by piece.’’41 He goes on to say that Nixon viewed the goal of rapprochement as an
opportunity to “redefine the American approach to foreign policy and international leadership.
He sought to demonstrate that… the United States was in a position to bring about a design for
long-term peace.”42 China’s incorporation into the world order would place the most populated
country in the world under U.S. influence and in a position that served U.S. interests. It would
40
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further facilitate a more dominant presence in Asia, a vast region the U.S. had yet to successfully
establish its authority. The desire to bring China into the international order, however, was not
simply a move to further U.S. leadership. There is imagined to be something particularly special
about China that requires careful monitoring, but also presents the need for a properly
functioning Sino-American relationship.
During the decades of non-communication with the PRC, the U.S. had full diplomatic
relations with Taiwan. Even after his defeat, the U.S. continued to support its old friend Chiang
Kai-shek, recognizing Taiwan and its government (the Republic of China) as the true and
legitimate China. As such, the ROC held a seat as one of the five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as the UN General Assembly and other major
international organizations. Taiwan relied upon its close relationship with the U.S. and place in
the world order for economic and military support, primarily for security from the much larger
mainland China. Under the Nixon administration, as rapprochement with the PRC became a
concrete goal, U.S. policy towards Taiwan began to change drastically. In July of 1971, 17 UN
members, led by Albania, requested that a question of the "Restoration of the lawful rights of the
People's Republic of China in the United Nations" be placed on the provisional agenda of the
UNGA.43 The next month, a second item was added to the provisional agenda, at the request of
the United States. This item reflected the opinion of the U.S. that the United Nations should
recognize both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China.
Nixon reflected that it was hard for him to take this position and disappoint the U.S.’s
“old friend and loyal ally.” While he would continue to honor the economic and military
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commitments to Taiwan, he felt “national security interests of the U.S. lay in developing
relations with the PRC.”44 The actual U.S. delegation to the UN, was much more committed to
Taiwan, diligently lobbying to preserve its seat. As such, Ambassador George H. W. Bush was
extremely concerned with the fact that Kissinger's preparatory trip to the PRC, was to coincide
with the UNGA’s decision on the membership of China. He thought this would undermine U.S.
efforts to keep Taiwan’s place in the U.N., and wanted the dates to be adjusted. However, Nixon
believed that “rapprochement with Beijing had priority over Taiwan's UN status and the schedule
was left unchanged.”45 On 25 October 1971, as Kissinger was returned from China, the General
Assembly voted to admit the People's Republic of China to the UN and expelled the Republic of
China. Taiwan, Nixon said, must know that Washington is engaging with the PRC, “not because
we love them. But because they’re there.”46
Images of China’s ancient greatness, offered the idea that Communism would not
withstand the long tradition of China’s great culture. On the other hand, images of China’s as a
U.S. ward, raised the assumption that the inferior people could not withstand total severance
from the United States. It was extremely significant, then, that this long enduring nation, under a
new and antagonistic political structure, had prevailed for so long completely without U.S. help.
More than this, there was the frightening memory of the surprising defeat of Americans by a
Chinese army in North Korea. It was clear that the People’s Republic was not going anywhere,
so it might as well be brought to the side of the U.S.. At the same time, Americans bore the
parental responsibility and guilt of the “loss of China.” It was the guardian’s fault that the good
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Chinese wards were subject to the cruelty of Communism. Thus, rapprochement gave Americans
the hope of fulfilling their benevolent duty––saving the Chinese people through the model of
liberal democracy.
It is important to explore the discursive paradoxes that arise with the dual images of
China. How could inferior and good people simultaneously embody the world’s greatest threat?
On the one hand, this allows the U.S. to imagine itself, along with its Western allies, as holding a
place at the top of a hierarchy of cultures. On the other hand, the essentializing notion of China’s
“Oriental barbarity,” seemingly proven by their role in the Korean War, constructs it as an
unpredictable and menacing figure. This threat would only get worse, as the PRC develops as a
nation, though the idea that it could ever rival the power of the United States is unthinkable. The
U.S. is still grappling with this conundrum to this day. China was never supposed to be a
powerful player on the World stage. The discursive reality of both China and the U.S., are
challenged by any success realized by China. However, these challenges do not undermine the
U.S. imagination on China, instead they further demonstrate the threat China poses.
This discourse of Chinese antagonism was much deeper than the Cold War fear of
Communism, or even the war in Vietnam. For almost a generation before Nixon took office,
there existed a perception that the PRC was the most alarming entity in international relations.
While Nixon consistently employs rhetoric that portrays China as a threat or dangerous, the
actual grounds for this belief are never explicitly elaborated upon. In one the many toasts during
his time in the PRC, he himself even said, “There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us
seeks the territory of the other. Neither of us seeks domination over the other. Neither of us seeks
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to stretch out our hands and rule the world.”47 Nixon makes many claims along the same lines as
the statement, “if we do not find a way to, despite our differences, to have discussions, we are on
a collision course years ahead, which would be very, very serious.”48 However, it is not plainly
clear why exactly this very serious collision course would come about. In a 1965 interview with
Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong even blatantly asserted that he had no intention of initiating
aggression with the United States, stating that China is “not going to start the war from our side;
only when the United States attacks shall we fight back… As I’ve already said, please rest
assured that we won’t attack the United States.”49
The gravity attributed to China, to influence the future conditions of the world was highly
due to the sheer size of its population. Nixon recognized China’s status as the most populous
country in the world as an indication to its potential as a nation, and more than this, its potential
as both a threat and a valuable asset. Nixon himself said, “The potential of China, though
obscured to most American observers by its isolation, was such that no sensible foreign policy
could ignore or exclude it.”50 On the one hand, China’s size could allow it to extend its alarming
presence on the world stage. On the other hand, the U.S. could possibly have influence over the
largest population in the world. Thus, Kissinger reflects that Nixon’s most remarkable foreign
policy achievement was “the opening to one-fifth of the world population.”51 By the Nixon
administration, it seemed the size of China had simply become too important to ignore.
Engagement, then, both moved towards promising strategic authority over a nation on the rise,
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but also sought to confront and contain the possibility of a more powerful China. A
Sino-American relationship would not only save China from itself, but would also save the world
from China. Reflecting on his trip, Nixon writes,
two impressions stand out most vividly. One is the awesome sight of the disciplined but
wildly––almost fanatically––enthusiastic audience at the gymnastics exhibition in
Peking, confirming my belief that we must cultivate China during the next few decades
while it is still learning to develop its national strength and potential. Otherwise we will
one day be confronted with the most formidable enemy that has ever existed in the
history of the world.52
Thus is the epitome of U.S. ambivalence towards China. Discourse on China dually understands
the U.S. to hold the role of paternalistic savior to China, and China to hold the role of an
antagonistic threat. A logical foreign policy, therefore, must necessarily take into account both of
these truths. The U.S. understanding of China demands a hybrid foreign policy approach of
containment and engagement, despite a multitude of contradictions. This is again exemplified by
Nixon’s comparison of diplomatic relations with the PRC to American domestic social reform,
where he says, “In each case dialogues have to be opened; in each case aggression has to be
restrained while education proceeds.”53
It is through his trip to the PRC, that Nixon fully recognizes China as a “sleeping
dragon.” The images of China’s potential to be a violently frightening foe already existed in the
U.S. imagination, now grounded by contemporary contexts. Not only was China one of the
oldest nations, but the most populated, and had at one point been the most advanced and
powerful country on earth. At the same time, Yellow Peril associations characterize China, as an
East Asian nation, to pose an inherent threat to Western values and civilization. This danger is
only intensified by China’s Communist ideology. Nixon’s understanding was that a powerful
52
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China, outside the influence of the U.S., would be the most formidable foe that ever existed,
because it would embody a physical threat, with an endless supply of soldiers; a threat to the
world order, as a despotic and country; and a threat to U.S. hegemony and identity.
The epistemic reality of China created by discourse, is evidently abundant with
contradictions. In the same essay that Nixon pronounced China to be Asia’s greatest threat, he
also wrote
Japan's gross national product ($95 billion) is substantially greater than that of mainland
China, with seven times the population. Japan is expected soon to rank as the world's
third-strongest economic power, trailing only the United States and the Soviet Union.
Along with this dramatic economic surge, Japan will surely want to play a greater role in
both diplomatically and militarily in maintaining balance in Asia. 54
This inconsistency is further underlined by the claims that the PRC actually needs the protection
of the United States. In discussions on U.S. military presence in Europe, Japan, and naval forces
in the Pacific, Nixon told Chou En-lai that if the U.S. withdrew from these areas of the world
“the dangers to the United States would be great–and the dangers to China would be even
greater.”55 Preserving the military establishment is further important for the U.S. to maintain an
ideal level of influence around the world. Despite the desire to establish Sino-American
relations, the U.S. still had the desire to curb the influence of the PRC in Asia, and uphold its
own. The regime of truth that this discourse establishes leaves no room for China, as a nation, to
be imagined as anywhere near as powerful as the U.S., at this time it was not even the most
powerful country in Asia, but it also remains true that China embodies an immense threat to the
world.
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Part 2: Barack Obama
"That is a sleeping dragon. Let him sleep! If he wakes, he will shake the world."
-Napoleon Bonaparte
It would seem that Nixon was entirely accurate to predict China’s great national potential.
With its economic reform and opening beginning in the late seventies, China has maintained its
place as one of the most rapidly growing economies. By the beginning of the Obama
administration in 2008, it was the world’s second largest economy and held the largest current
account surplus and foreign exchange reserves.56 By this time too, China’s military was the third
strongest in the world, maintaining a continuous and focused effort on military modernization
and enhancement.57 In the less than fifty years since Nixon and Mao reopened a Sino-American
dialogue, China emerged in the twenty-first century as one of the world’s leading superpowers.
Despite the many changes that both China and the U.S have experienced since 1972, discourse
and foreign policy on China have remained consistent since the Nixon administration. The U.S.
imagination on China is firmly established, while the real China grows and changes. If the U.S.
considered China to be the most alarming global presence in 1972, when the PRC was still very
new, China as a global superpower is basically unacceptable. As such, the very real, and
undeniable, rise of China is pointed to as one of the biggest challenges the U.S. will have to face
in this century. Anxieties over the growing power of China go deeper than the fear of great
power displacement. The U.S. imagination perceives there to be something exceptional about
China, that renders it an inherently threatening entity. Part of the Obama administration rhetoric
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on China claimed a readiness to welcome China’s growing influence and desire to collaborate
with China on global issues. However, any deviation from U.S. global leadership is seen as
assertiveness or aggression on the part of China. Furthermore, President Obama majorly shifted
American foreign policy from a focus on the Middle East, and the War on Terror, to the
Asia-Pacific region, a move outwardly intended to check China’s influence. In fact, hardly any
effort was made to conceal the true policy objective of containing China. From the establishment
of modern discourse on China, under Nixon, the U.S. imagination has left no room for China to
truly exist on the world stage.
While U.S. discourse and policy on China have broadly stayed in place since 1972, there
are actually interesting parallels between specific contexts of Nixon’s policy of rapprochement
and Obama’s pivot towards Asia. Richard Nixon entered office in 1969, in the throws of the
disastrous American war in Vietnam. The U.S., believing itself to be the most powerful nation in
the world and the standard for peace and freedom, was internationally humiliated by its
involvement in a costly and violent war that it could not win. As one of the main actors in the
Vietnam War, the PRC was still a newly established country, nowhere near a superpower, but
clearly a nation on the rise, after a long period of domestic and international turmoil. Forty years
later, Barack Obama was elected president, while the U.S. entered year seven of the War on
Terror, with no end in sight. Like Vietnam, the War on Terror has ended up being a long winded,
unnecessary, and internationally embarrassing failure. At the same time, China was again
entering into a new era, no longer a brand new country, but a brand new global superpower.
During the Nixon and Obama administrations, respectively, China’s existence was recognized as
an issue that required special attention at the forefront of American foreign policy. It is in these
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cases, where China takes a central position in the American political dialogue, that the
consistencies of U.S. discourse and policy on China, with all of their contradictions and
shortcomings, are most pronounced.
It is interesting to explore the limits imposed on foreign policy by considering how little
the actual bilateral relationship between China and the U.S. changed in the many years since
Nixon’s visit. While rapprochement was initiated in 1972, and Sino-American relations were
officially normalized six years later, in the Obama administration there is still the rhetoric around
the “seeking” a friendly relationship or “exploring” a possible partnership. While China has been
consistently considered “one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the
United States has ever had to manage,” the Obama administration after 40 year apparently
searching for some common ground amid the supposed vast differences. Probably most
important, however, is the fact that the Obama administration sought the fulfillment of the same
roles that envisioned during the Nixon administration. In his memoir, Obama writes that
following a speech he gave in China, he “left the town hall acutely aware the winning over this
new generation depended on my ability to show that America’s democratic, rights-based,
pluralistic system could still deliver on the promise of a better life.”58 Obama engages with
missionary images of China as a U.S. ward. He operates under the idea that people in China, not
only need, but want to be saved by American liberal democracy. As, Hillary Clinton writes,
It flows from our model of free democracy and free enterprise, a model that remains the
most powerful source of prosperity and progress known to humankind. I hear everywhere
I go that the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military is by far the
strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the world. Our workers are the most
productive. Our universities are renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt
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that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century
as we did in the last.59
The U.S. then is cast not only in the role of benevolent guardian, but indisputable hegemonic
superpower.
Obama entered into office as the self-proclaimed “first Pacific president,” declaring that
the U.S. had become too disengaged from Asian regional issues and needed to restore and
enhance its level of engagement there. These sentiments were parodied by Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, who declared America to be in its “Pacific century,” writing that one of the most
important duties of twenty-first century American foreign policy is to increase diplomatic,
economic, and strategic investments in the Asia-Pacific region, which would support the broad
effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership.60 The rationale for the rebalance was
logical, the Asia-Pacific region makes up almost half the world’s population and has increasingly
moved towards the global political and economic center of gravity. Jeffery Bader, the senior
director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council in Obama’s first term, asserts that one
of the key elements of the administration’s Asia policy, was a strong China strategy that rested
on three pillars:
(1) a welcoming approach to China’s emergence, influence, and legitimate expanded role;
(2) a resolve to see that its rise is consistent with international norms and law; and (3) an
endeavor to shape the Asia-Pacific environment to ensure that China’s rise is stabilizing
rather than disruptive.61
While the U.S. claimed an openness to the rise of China, in practice, foreign policy was
concentrated on thwarting China’s global influence and leadership. A more powerful China will
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only be accepted, so long as it stays within the confines of U.S. constructed world order. Any
deviation from the global liberal norms or proposed amendments, is not tolerated and
exemplifies China’s danger. The only way to alleviate the threat of China, is to ensure that it is
subject to U.S. authority, or at the very least does not infringe upon it. While engagement was the
principal characteristic of U.S. overall Asia policy, it actually worked to contain China, largely
by reinforcing the domination of American influence in the region.
The overall Asia strategy included six main lines of action––strengthening bilateral
alliances, participation in regional multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment,
constructing a growing comprehensive military presence, deepening relationships with emerging
powers, along with advancing democracy and human rights.62 The administration emphasised the
importance of engagement in the region, building new relationships and strengthening old ones.
It was a stated priority of the Obama administration to “strengthen cooperation among partners in
the region, leverage their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded
states that sustains and strengthens a rules-based regional order and addresses regional and
global challenges.”63 The U.S. sought to shape and immerse itself in the architecture of the
Asia-Pacific, so that American values and interests could be advanced in the region. More than
this though, was the effort to prevent China from extending its own interests and influence in the
region. Establishing relationships with China’s neighbors is claimed to be an effort to ensure that
China’s rise is stabilizing and constructive. However, Hillary Clinton revealed the true objective,
when she expressed that “working with more allies and partners will provide a more robust
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bulwark against threats or efforts to undermine regional peace and stability.”64 This threat, of
course, is posed by the rising China. In arguments for a strong and sustained presence in Asia,
the Obama administration positioned the U.S. in the role of global protector. The pivot towards
Asia, was apparently just as much for the benefit of the region, as the U.S. would serve as a
much needed protector and guardian for Asian countries and their interests, especially from the
ever threatening China. While speaking in Japan, Obama noted that, “these alliances continue to
provide the bedrock of security and stability that has allowed the nations and peoples of this
region to pursue opportunity and prosperity that was unimaginable at the time of my first
childhood visit to Japan.”65 More than this, the administration insisted that a significant U.S.
presence is actually appreciated by the majority of Asian states. Jeffery Bader alleges that the
region sees the U.S. as,
a source of innovation, trade and investment, ideas, and educational opportunities; as the
protector and provider of global public goods such as freedom of the seas and an open
trade and investment system; as protector of the weak and defenseless against
aggression… In their eyes, America is an essential stabilizing force as rising powers,
principally China but also India, gain influence.66
Presumably, all sides would benefit from bilateral relations with the U.S., even China. The U.S.
would “accept” China’s growth, serve as a stabilizing force for other Asian states, and
demonstrate its own capacity for leadership. In reality, the Obama administration was pursuing
strategic relationships as a means of containing China. The U.S. wanted to solidify influence
over Asian states and condition them with American values. Leveraging present and future
regional partners would, hopefully, lower the possibility of China expanding its influence and
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gaining power. The U.S. needed to be to be the dominant authority in the region, so that China
would not have the chance to be.
Obama professed to believe in a “smarter kind of American leadership,” saying that the
U.S. “leads best when we combine military power with strong diplomacy; when we leverage our
power with coalition building.”67 Obama’s rebalance conveyed military power as a tool that
would support deeper engagement and stronger partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. However, the
increase in military focus on the Asia-Pacific was a relatively unambiguous strategy of
containment. In January 2012, the Department of Defense released Sustaining US Global
Leadership – Priorities for 21st Century Defense, as a move to refocus the Pentagon’s priorities
and capacity. The Defense Strategic Guidance declares that “while the U.S. military will
continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
region.”68 China’s ascension to superpower status has naturally included advancement in military
capabilities and thus the U.S. would balance these capabilities with its own, and check China’s
influence and power. The necessity behind this military rebalance, is the management of China’s
power and influence. In the same month the Pentagon released the Joint Operational Access
Concept (JOAC), which outlines how the U.S. is to maintain, in the face of anti-access or
area-denial, operational access to any region of the world––be it sea, land, air, space or
cyberspace. The document states that “as a global power with global interests, the United States
must maintain the credible capability to project military force into any region of the world in
support of those interests.”69 While no adversary is explicitly named, anti-access and area-denial
is usually associated with claims of China’s disrupting freedom of navigation in the South China
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Sea. A component of the JOAC was the Air-Sea Battle concept, whose intent was to properly
integrate air, land, naval, space, and cyberspace forces to develop the capabilities to “deter and, if
necessary, defeat an adversary employing sophisticated antiaccess/area-denial capabilities. It
focuses on ensuring that joint forces will possess the ability to project force as required to
preserve and defend U.S. interests well into the future.”70 This went along with the
announcement by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert that by 2020 the U.S.
planned to increase its allocation of naval ships and aircraft from a 50-50 split between the
Atlantic and Pacific Ocean to 60 percent of assets assigned to the Pacific Ocean.71 This was to
include six aircraft carriers, a number of cruisers, destroyers, combat ships, and submarines; the
deployment of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Australia, Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore; F-22s and
MV-22 Ospreys in Japan; establishing fully capable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces in Japan,
Guam and Hawaii; hosting military forces at the Subic Bay base for the first time in 20 years;
upgrading army capabilities in Korea; and increasing military exercises in the region.72 Forging a
broad-based military presence in the region would physically support the effort to curb China’s
influence (and physically contain it if necessary) and counter any interference to American
interests.
Foreign policy considered it strategically important for the U.S. to not only participate,
but lead in the most important multilateral regional organizations. The U.S. sought to shape the
institutional and economic architecture, in order to reinforce the norms and rules of the liberal
international order. Obama was committed to strengthening the role of regional organizations,
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including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), and the East
Asian Summit (EAS.) U.S. institutional leadership was a crucial step for the goal of promoting
democratic values and defending universal values across the region. A stronger relationship with
ASEAN, and its related organizations, was considered especially significant for the economic,
strategic, and military interests of the U.S. and “an underpinning of a broader Asian
equilibrium.”73 There are immense anxieties about China's potential influence in relation to the
U.S. led world order. Thus, the stated mission of the U.S.-ASEAN partnership, is “building and
sustaining a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific, one in which countries can pursue their
objectives peacefully and in accordance with international law and norms.”74 Since Nixon, the
world order has been considered a means through which the threat of China could be contained
and it is unacceptable to think that China could have an equal say to the U.S. and upset the
established order. Multilateralism in Asia and the push for universal (American) values in the
region are intended to counter China’s growing clout.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), signed in 2016, was a decisive signal of the U.S.’s
commitment to holding a position of authority in the region. President Obama announced in
November 2009 the U.S.’s intention of participating in TPP negotiations in order to accomplish
an ambitious, Asia-Pacific trade agreement that reflects U.S. priorities and values. The TPP was
“central to the U.S. vision of Asia’s future and its place in it” and a critical step toward “the
strategic goal of revitalizing the open, rules-based economic system that the United States has
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led since World War II.”75 For the U.S., the TPP was a strategic channel through which it could
play a leading role in writing the rules for an important region during a pivotal moment of global
transition. The TPP’s promise was to promote economic growth; job creation and retention;
enhance innovation, productivity and competitiveness; and raise living standards and reduce
poverty in member states.The free-trade agreement was proposed between Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S.,
and Vietnam. These countries represented 40 percent of global GDP and about a third of world
trade.76 Therefore, the TPP would put 40 percent of the world economy on the side of the U.S.,
which could counter the 16 percent of global GDP that China held by Obama’s final year in
office.77 China’s dazzling economic growth was central to its growing global ascension, the TPP
was a window of opportunity to curb China’s rise at the source. By creating a trade zone
covering a portion of East Asia would further deepen the U.S.’s role in Asia’s economic
framework, and hopefully isolate China. Recognizing the upward trajectory of China, this kind
of engagement was intended to establish the U.S. as a permanent fixture in regional affairs.
Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated that involvement in multilateral institutions,
like the TPP, send “the strongest possible message to other countries in the region that we’re
there for the long haul...it has the tremendous potential, to be a magnet to move other countries
in the direction of the highest possible standards.”78 These standards, of course, are those set by
the U.S. example.
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Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, claimed
that the focus of the TPP is not on China, saying that “this is not an anti-China deal. This is a
pro-U.S., pro-Asia-Pacific, trade deal that does so much to set high standards that we can’t afford
not to ratify it.”79 Anthony Blinken, too, claimed that the TPP, and rebalance in general, were
“not about isolating China or keeping it down or containing it.”80 He even asserted that there was
hope that China would someday be a part of the TPP. Obama’s Asia policy, as a whole, was built
around

the language of

engagement––bilateral

engagement, multilateral institutional

engagement, even engagement with China. The rebalancing effort actually included the objective
of building a sturdy relationship and strategic partnership with China. However in his 2016 State
of the Union address, Obama urged the approval of the TPP, under the argument that it was
necessary for ensuring that the U.S. did not lose authority to China. He states,
We forged a Trans-Pacific Partnership to open markets, and protect workers and the
environment, and advance American leadership in Asia. It cuts 18,000 taxes on products
made in America, which will then support more good jobs here in America. With TPP,
China does not set the rules in that region; we do. You want to show our strength in this
new century? Approve this agreement. Give us the tools to enforce it. It's the right thing
to do.81
The U.S. could not let China, the most populous country in the world, shape the future of the
most populous region in the world. If China were to be the dominant influence in Asia, then it
would have more dominant influence globally. In the U.S. imagination, as the influence of China
grows, so too does its threat to the world order, and the world. Not only did the U.S. want to
integrate the norms of the liberal order into the framework of the region, it wanted the region to
be integrated into the framework of the liberal order. The rebalance also sought to strengthen
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international institutions––such as the G-20, the IMF, the Financial Stability Board, the World
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank––and ensure that they are more inclusive of
Asia-Pacific states. While engagement with states and institutions in Asia worked towards
containing the threat of China’s growing influence, China as an entity would still remain
threatening in the U.S. imagination. Assistant Secretary Daniel Russel noted that from the outset,
President Obama had a clear objective of seeing that a rising China integrate into the
Asia-Pacific system of rules and of international law.82 Of course, this was in addition to the
objective of shaping the Asia-Pacific region to reflect the liberal international order and
American leadership. From the time of Sino-American rapprochement, the U.S. has sought
China’s full absorption into the world order, not just as a participant but a subservient and
malleable constituent.
Nixon sought China’s integration into the established world order as a way to address its
threatening presence. The expectation was that China could play a more constructive role,
presumably adapting to the U.S. model, within the system rather than outside of it. Since then,
China has become a major fixture in some of the most prominent international
institutions––including the UN, the WTO, the G-20, the World Bank, and the IMF––along with
holding a seat as one of the permanent five Security Council members. A principle of the Obama
administration’s China strategy was that “China should not be considered an inevitable
adversary, but rather a potential partner in resolving critical global issues.”83 Still, China remains
a threatening presence in the U.S. imagination, exacerbated by its progressively growing power.
In accordance with the administration’s engagement based strategy, Obama declared that the
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U.S. “welcomes China's effort to play a greater role on the world stage.”84 According to deputy
secretary of state James Steinberg, the administration’s vision for Sino-American relations
operated with an appreciation for the insight that began with Nixon, recognizing “that the
long-term interests of the United States were better served not by trying to thwart China’s
ambitions, but rather to explore the possibility of whether China could become a partner with the
United States.”85 In fact, the U.S. actually called for China to take on bigger responsibility in
global issues. In a 2014 interview for the New York times, Obama expressed that while the
United States has been left with bearing the burdens of upholding international security,
prosperity, and overall global good, the Chinese are ‘free riders,’ “they have been free riders for
the last 30 years, and it’s worked really well for them.”86 By dubbing China a global free rider,
the President indicated that the country was benefiting from the U.S. constructed international
system without shouldering the responsibilities.
The U.S. apparently sought out a cooperative partner in China, one that would work
alongside the U.S. in addressing global challenges. The idea was, China and the U.S. have
common interests in addressing these challenges and would mutually benefit from collaboration.
Obama identified the most pressing global challenges as: economic recovery and stability;
climate change; nuclear proliferation; and transnational threats.”87 In the early years of Obama’s
presidency, the U.S. was suffering, domestically and internationally, from the effects of the 2008
financial crisis. The Obama administration had to work to reverse the view that the crisis had
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permanently damaged U.S. global leadership. Meanwhile, China was the second largest global
economy and held more than $700 billion in U.S. debt and enormous amounts of foreign
currency reserves, making it a necessary partner for U.S. interests domestically and abroad.88 The
U.S. called upon China to take on more responsibility in tackling climate change, as the two
countries are the largest emitters of CO2, representing around 40 percent of emissions globally.
Obama also pushed for China’s support in the punishment states seeking nuclear weapon
capabilities and the fight against terrorism in the Middle East. This went along with the criticism
of China for its economic and diplomatic ties with “bad actors” like Iran and North Korea, along
with benefiting from investments in Iraq without working to deal with the local conflict. China
has been involved in international efforts to confront these issues. Secretary Clinton pointed to
the role of China in economic recovery, writing that, “in the aftermath of the global financial
crisis, the United States and China worked effectively through the G-20 to help pull the global
economy back from the brink.”89 China joined efforts with the U.S. in taking on a leadership role
in tackling the climate crisis.90 The countries confirmed their joint entrance into the Paris Climate
Agreement on September 3rd, 2016. Obama himself asserted that China played a critical role in
economic recovery from the global financial crisis, has promoted security and stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is committed to the global nonproliferation regime.91
China’s expanded role on the international stage, or even its presence, is only accepted
when it is in line with U.S. interests. Any attempt, by China, to exist autonomously as a
superpower or make its own contribution to the world order, is rejected by the U.S. and
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perceived as actively unsettling. In a 2013 speech at the Indonesian Parliament, Chinese
President Xi Jinping proposed the establishment of an Asian infrastructure investment bank.92
President Xi emphasised the harmonious, nonrevisionist nature of China’s vision for the bank,
stating the intention for cooperation bilaterally, multilaterally, regionally, and with existing
multilateral development banks.93 This new international development bank would provide
financing for infrastructure projects in Asia. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
was formally established in December of 2015 with 57 founding members and officially opened
for business on January 16, 2016. According to the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement, the purpose of
the Bank was to:
(i) foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure
connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors; and (ii)
promote regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by
working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development
institutions.94
Not only does the AIIB, as a multilateral institution, work within the expectations of the
established international order, it also shows China’s interest in taking on more global
responsibilities–– which is exactly what the U.S. claimed it wanted. However, this initiative was
taken as a direct challenge, and rival, to the international lending bodies that reflect of American
interests, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB.) Fearing the institution to be a vehicle for Chinese influence the U.S
reacted with steadfast opposition to the AIIB, trying to marginalize the bank’s impact and
pressure its allies against participation. Though outwardly, the White House’s opposition to the
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AIIB presented as the fear that it would undercut the “high standards” set by established U.S. led
institutions.
Despite the U.S.’s best efforts to alienate and delegitimize the AIIB, some of its top allies
have become members, including South Korea, Australia, the U.K, Germany, France, Italy, and
Canada. Upon the U.K.’s announcement that it would be a founding member of the bank, the
Obama administration responded that the U.S. is “wary about a trend toward constant
accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power.”95 The overall U.S.
approach towards China, in general, believed indulgence and accommodation of, so-called,
“assertive Chinese conduct” could “embolden bad behavior.”96 The stark condemnation of the
U.K.’s entrance into the bank emphasizes the extent to which Washington wanted to keep allies
away from, and indeed contain, the bank. As such, the U.S. has resolutely turned its back on any
opportunity for AIIB membership. The U.S.’s stance on the AIBB presents a multitude of
contradictions. For one, the Obama administration’s vision for the Asia-Pacific was stated to
include the desire to see “emerging partners shaping and participating in a rules-based regional
and global order.”97 At a deeper level of course was the objective of preventing rising powers
from acting outside of, or undermining, the world order that has prevailed since WWII. Still, the
AIIB doesn’t challenge the status-quo of global governance as it largely conforms to the models
of the existing institutions of the “rules-based” order. Moreover, the lack of U.S. participation in
the investment bank is inconsistent with the policy of using engagement as a means to shape the
region to be in line with American influence and the established order. Obama stressed the
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importance of playing a substantial role in shaping the future conditions of Asia. However, being
an AIIB outsider diminishes the capacity to address the Obama administration’s concerns about
the environmental, human rights, and institutional standards of the bank or the notion that it
would serve as a vehicle for China to further its interests unchecked, which are supposedly the
very reasons for not joining. The U.S.’s refusal to participate in the AIIB illustrates the U.S’s
refusal to accept any initiative led by China. Upon the U.S.’s arrival as a superpower, it was able
to take a commanding position in the construction of a world order that represented its values
and interests. The PRC, not only was left out of the construction of the world order, but as a
superpower is being restrained from playing a hand in the adjustment of the world order to
reflect its own interests and values, obliged to conform to the domination of U.S. authority in the
established order.
Not only did the U.S. reject China’s contribution to the world order, there is little room
for China to grow its influence in the pre existing multilateral economic institutions. In fact, the
creation of the AIIB cannot be unrelated to China’s dissatisfaction with these institutions. China
lobbied for years about the need for structural reform of the ADB and the IMF, so as to give
emerging economies a larger say. The Asian Development Bank has been dominated by the U.S.
and Japan since its creation in 1966. In the IMF too, the U.S., as the largest shareholder, has had
by far the most influence and power. Obama’s deputy secretary of state asserted that the
international community must “ensure that new powers like China can take their rightful place at
the table without generating fear or mistrust. That means making the institutions more inclusive
so that they reflect the world of today, rather than the world of 1945 or the 1970.”98 However,
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China’s attempts to reconcile its influence in the ADB with the size of its economy have not been
fruitful. China is the largest economy in Asia, though only the third-largest shareholder in the
ADB, holding less than half the voting power of both the U.S. and Japan during the Obama
administration. IMF reform was in fact proposed by the G-20 in 2010 (though it did not enter
force until January of 2016) which would double China’s voting power, making it the
third-largest shareholder. However, under the proposed reforms U.S. voting power (16.5 percent
of total votes) was still to be over double that of China (6.068 percent of total votes.)99
Additionally, with 16.5 percent of total votes, the U.S. would still have the unique veto power
over major decisions, as the approval of major IMF decisions requires a supermajority vote of 85
percent of members. Thus, it would be able to control China’s influence within the IMF. As the
U.S. has the power to veto increases in member’s quota share, with larger proportions of quota
equating to greater say in how the IMF is run. China’s rise has brought into question whether the
international order is meant to work for everyone. Indeed, despite its best efforts to claim
otherwise, the world order was made by the U.S. and for the U.S.
What becomes apparent is that Obama’s foreign policy does not take China on its own
terms. In fact, the discursive space that dictates forign policy on China actually prevents taking
China on its own terms. While Obama called upon the world to embrace a “new era of
engagement based on mutual interests and mutual respect,” he still functions within a dominant
discourse that has perpetuated the same limitations on foreign policy, since its establishment.100
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The discursive shortcomings grow increasingly pronounced as China takes up more space on the
world stage. While the Obama administration tried its best to convey an engagement based
foreign policy approach, there is, by design, limited room left for the real China to exist. The
Obama administration consistently emphasised its sincere belief that,
in an interconnected world, power does not need to be a zero-sum game, and nations need
not fear the success of another. Cultivating spheres of cooperation -- not competing
spheres of influence -- will lead to progress in the Asia Pacific.101
However, this has become increasingly more untrue, as the divergence between China in the U.S.
imagination and the real China becomes more apparent.
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Conclusion
The Present and the Future
The primary goal of this paper was to present the argument that U.S. foreign policy on
China is limited by discourse. I identified three important functions of discourse to be the
production (and reproduction) of (1) binary oppositions; (2) regimes of truth and epistemic
realities; and (3) social identities. By nature, discourses construct social realities that function
within frameworks of meaning, thereby defining what is knowable and true about a given
subject. In other words, there can be no legitimate truth outside the bounds of a discursive
framework. Necessarily operating within these fixed systems of knowledge, foreign policies are
both the product and reproducers of discourses. Through the process of Sino-American
rapprochement, a hegemonic discourse was established that has since defined how China is
understood by Americans. This particular discourse is informed by a vast array of conflicting
images that together constitute what I refer to as the U.S. imagination on China. Within the
framework of this discourse, all of these images are simultaneously true, despite the
contradictions this raises. That means China is definitively superior and inferior; heathen and
humanist; wise sage and “barbaric Orient;'' peaceful and violent; a U.S. ward and a U.S. foe.
In parallel with this discourse emerged a U.S. foreign policy on China that perpetually
seeks the inconsistent objectives of both containment and engagement. Through the analysis of
the discursive representations of China and specific foreign policies of Nixon and Obama,
respectively, it became evident that U.S. foreign policy does not recognize the physical reality of
China. This is because foreign policy must necessarily function within the framework set by
discourse, so the U.S. is limited to seeking a foreign policy based on the ambivalent construction
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of China that exists exclusively in its imagination. While I chose to explore my argument
through the analysis of these particular presidents, that does not mean this phenomenon is
associated exclusively with these two instances. In fact, because discourse reproduces the
knowledge it defines, the same limitations remained constant throughout the six administrations
between Nixon and Obama’s presidencies. Specific images of China fluctuated in and out of the
center of discourse, at different points in these almost four decades, but always remained
inextricable from the whole understanding of China.
As a figure who publicly resolved to disrupt the American political status quo, Donald
Trump represents an especially interesting juncture in this hegemonic discursive framework.
During his campaign for the 2016 election, Trump vowed that as president he would "shake the
rust off America's foreign policy.”102 Indeed Trump’s presidency is largely regarded as a
profound departure from traditional methods of post-WWII U.S. leadership. The Trump
administration’s general foreign policy broke from the traditional view that U.S. interests are
rooted in its widespread involvement in the world order and global affairs, instead emphasizing
nationalism with the “America First” policy. Trump himself is widely regarded as an anomalous
figure, and indeed in certain moments transgressed the boundaries of conventional presidential
discourse. However, while Trump did seem to recognize a shortcoming in U.S. foreign policy, he
did not overcome or fundamentally shake the strong foundation of the U.S. imagination on
China.
Some of the Trump administration’s actions do seem to fully diverge from certain
positions that have been central to China policy since Nixon. Most significantly, The Trump
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administration deviated from the traditional U.S. foreign policy that emphasized American
global leadership, alliances, and promoting the rules-based order. The foreign policy of “America
First,” appeared to reject the world order that the U.S. worked so hard to create and maintain.
While it's hard to pinpoint the specifics of this policy, it is related to Trump’s argument that other
nations have been able to use the global order to take advantage of the U.S., or infringe upon
U.S. interests. After all, the U.S. largely attributes China’s growing power to its participation in
the international economic system America designed. The slogan of “America First” has
prominent historical associations with nationalist and isolationist approaches to international
relations. Seemingly in line with this, the Trump administration withdrew from a number of
multilateral agreements (including the TPP, the INF Treaty, and the Paris Climate Agreement,)
criticized and lessened engagement with such institutions as the UN and WTO, and alienated
some of the U.S.’s closest allies. Many saw these moves as the abdication of global leadership,
bringing into question the future of the liberal international order and U.S. hegemony.
These moves both physically and symbolically reversed many of the objectives of the
Obama administration’s China policy––which was inherently based in maintaining global
leadership through the support of the international order. Of course this is in line with a broad
theme of rolling back Obama’s legacy, however Trump's stance on the word order sets him apart
from the vision for China that has been sought since Nixon. Having said that, the reasoning
behind Trump’s skepticism about the world order, actually demonstrates that he functions within
the same discursive space as his predecessors. Instead of looking to the world order as a tool for
perpetuating U.S. interests, Trump believes it does not support U.S. interests enough. In his
inaugural address Trump lamented, in what was assuredly a reference to China, “we’ve made
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other countries rich while the wealth, strength and confidence of our country has disappeared
over the horizon.”103 Any disruption the Trump administration presented to the tradition of world
order based foreign policy strategies, was not a foregoing of U.S. global dominance. In fact,
Trump was attempting to convey that U.S. power demanded to be acknowledged and accounted
for. While a definite breach in norms, Trump was engaging with the discourse that legitimizes
the U.S.’s exclusive right to international hegemony and leaves room only for U.S. interests. The
administration’s lean towards a more unilateralist policy was informed by the idea that American
interest should be perpetuated by the international community, without question or
accommodation.
The idea that the fulfillment of American interests should be sought by all was very much
intrinsic to the U.S.’s construction and maintenance of the world order. However, in reality,
neither the world order nor whatever alternative Trump originally thought he was offering can
make U.S. interests the exclusive prerogative of international affairs. To state the obvious, this is
because outside of the U.S. imagination there are other interests that exist. The exit of the U.S.
from multilateral agreements actually left room for China to garner more influence and take on
larger roles of leadership––which was decidedly what the U.S. did not want. Above all the
strategic objective of protecting U.S. hegemony from China remained integral to U.S. foreign
policy.
The Trump administration supposedly ended the engagement based foreign policy
approach to China that had been sought by every president since Nixon. According to the White
House, China policy in the 21st century was a failure and needed to be reworked. The
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administration's strategic approach to China recognized that while engagement was sought with
the genuine hope that China would adapt to be a constructive and responsible global stakeholder,
over the span of 40 years this has still not played out in the way the U.S. envisioned. Instead,
Donald Trump aimed to build a policy that demonstrated a “tough on China” stance. Trump did
recognize that foreign policy on China had long been inadequate, but his attempts at a revised
foreign policy function within the same discursive frame that has defined foreign policy for
generations. While Trump is the only president that has explicitly stated to be seeking something
other than engagement, from the beginning engagement has been contradictorily tied to the
objectives of containment. The Obama administration presented an especially dazzling language
of engagement that thinly veiled a foreign policy focused on thwarting China’s influence. The
shortcomings of the U.S. imagination on China have become increasingly more prevalent with
China’s rise in the 21st century. China’s changing role on the one hand, becomes more and more
irreconcilable with its discursive reality, while on the other hand aggravates images that define
China to be a threat.
Pursuing a policy of engagement was of importance in regards both to the image of China
as an American ward and the image of China as a sleeping dragon. Nixon’s biggest takeaway
from his first trip to China was that the U.S. must cultivate China before it realizes its full
potential. He warned that if this civilizing mission failed, China would become the most
formidable enemy that has ever existed in the history of the world. By the Trump administration,
the U.S. had not only failed to materialize the image of China as a subservient pupil to the U.S.,
China has, in fact, established itself as one of the most powerful nations in the world. It would
then seem that the sleeping dragon has been awakened, if not already awake. Therefore, images
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in the U.S. imagination that define China as dangerous and an enemy are especially at the
forefront of discourse. Thus, regardless of its legitimate foreign policy objectives, China has
been progressively characterized as more and more assertive and an inherent threat to U.S.
interests. The confirmed threat of China, imagined to be more realized than ever, required the
U.S. to react with a proper strategy for defending its interests. Therefore, the Trump
administration’s claims to putting aside engagement based China policy is not necessarily a
deviation from the status quo, but actually a manifestation of the authority of discursive
representation.
The “tough on China” rhetoric is an important way for the U.S. to assuage its ontological
security as China transgresses the identity discourse constructed of it. Thus, as China takes up
more space on the world stage, the U.S. is bearing in mind the need to protect its exclusive right
to global authority. While the Obama administration rejected the notion that the U.S. and China
were engaged in a strategic rivalry, the Trump administration framed Sino-American relations as
a new era of great power competition. Before the world was hit with the Coronavirus pandemic
in 2020––which fueled Yellow Peril discourse––one of the most striking and controversial
policies of the Trump administration was the trade war it initiated with China. The Trump
administration demonstrated that its approach to China would be more confrontational than in
the past, employing policies of straightforward punishment. While the legacy of the Trump
administration’s China policy is still unfolding, the trade war seemed to hurt the U.S. economy
structural imbalances of the U.S.-China trade relationship have yet to be resolved. Interestingly,
former president Obama considers a more hardline approach to China to be legitimate. He
reflected “if we hadn’t been going through a financial crisis, my posture toward China would
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have been more explicitly contentious around trade issues… But I couldn’t have a trade war in
2009 or 2010.”104 Furthermore, the Biden administration announced that all American tariffs will
stay in place for now.
In fact, Joe Biden’s campaign and first few months as president, further demonstrate the
persistence of this dominant discursive framework. China has, for decades, been used as a tool
for political polarity in domestic politics. In the months leading up to the 2020 presidential
election, candidates Donald Trump and Joe Biden engaged in a sort of battle to prove who is
‘tougher’ on China. Both candidates rolled out political advertisements critiquing their
opponent’s stance on China, positioning themselves as foreign policy foils. While this was
intended to distinguish the candidates from one another, they were actually exemplifying the
hegemony of the discourse on China. The advertisement released by Trump cast Biden as too
soft on China. The phrases, “Biden protected China’s feelings… Biden stands up for China…
while China tries to cripple America” flash across the screen while clips of Biden saying
“They’re not bad folks, folks” and “The growth of China is overwhelmingly in our interest” play
in the background. The video concludes with “Biden: bad for America,” meaning that Biden is
bad for America because he is supposedly not tough enough to stand up against China, who then
must be some sort of enemy. While there are some unsubstantiated claims about Biden in this ad,
the overall theme fits within the framework of the dominant discourse and the regime of truth
that establishes China as a threat.
The advertisement aired by Biden’s team engages in the same discourse, and therefore is
granted legitimacy. This video responds to the claims that Biden is too friendly with China, by
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slamming Trump for being too soft and trusting of the Chinese government in the early stages of
the coronavirus pandemic. While this is a critique of President Trump, Biden’s actually political
opponent, China is displayed as the true adversary in this short video. The advertisement asserts,
“Trump rolled over for the Chinese he took their word for it” and that “Trump praised the
Chinese 15 times in January and February as the coronavirus spread across the world.” The ad
brands China's government, and its people, as untrustworthy. Trump is faulted for not being an
effective enough protagonist to confront a threatening China. The video further demonstrates that
Biden will hypothetically be a more masculine and tough leader, equipped to put China in its
proper place, that is, subordinate to the U.S.. Biden says in a clip, "I would be on the phone with
China making it clear: We are going to need to be in your country. You have to be open. You
have to be clear. We have to know what's going on." In the attempt to distinguish their respective
stances on China, Joe Biden and Donald Trump demonstrate that the “stances” they can take are
limited. If they were not to conform to the hegemonic discourse, there would be no authority in
their claims.
The Biden administration has regrounded foreign policy in the liberal international order
and strength of American global leadership. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken revealed that he
thinks that China’s goals are based on the belief that “it can be and should be and will be the
dominant country in the world.”105 As such, in his first speech to congress, Joe Biden himself
plainly stated that America is “in competition with China and other countries to win the 21st
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Century.”106 This language, that characterizes global leadership as something to be won, is a shift
from the fear that China will present a disruption to the world order or will seek revisionist aims.
The fear now is that China will completely upend the world order. Thus, it is a contradiction for
Blinken to says,
I want to be very clear about something. And this is important. Our purpose is not to
contain China, to hold it back, to keep it down. It is to uphold this rules-based order that
China is posing a challenge to. Anyone who poses a challenge to that order, we're going
to stand up and defend it.107
Discursively, China represents a threat to the U.S. world order on the basis of its rising position
of power. In this moment, where power competition and harsh stances are legitimate policies, the
U.S. very plainly seeks to contain China. The U.S. continues to present an increasingly
contratradictory and increasingly limited discourse on China as it fails to reconcile its
imagination with reality. While this essentialist misrepresentation of China has always been
extremely problematic, the inability to consider China on its own terms is both dangerous and
unsustainable. For, in reality, a future world where China is the most powerful state is not
unthinkable.
What would it mean for the U.S. to take China on its own terms? What would a truly
progressive policy on China entail? What would a China inclusive, or even a China led world
order look like? Is it even possible for the U.S. to transcend discursive limits on its own
prerogative? It is important to look towards the future of Sino-American relations. I
unfortunately do not have the facilities to dismantle a hegemonic discourse, with which
American identity is so inextricably intertwined. However, I do know that this would necessarily
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require the U.S. to grapple with the identity it has constructed for both China and itself. This
effort would need to be a collaborative effort that involves more than just politicians and policy
experts. In fact, the task might certainly have to be initiated outside of the political sphere
altogether. I do suggest that an increased diversity in voices that are permitted to speak and are
actually heard might be a significant starting point.
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